Analyzing
expansion during the initial stages of recovery-accounting for an average of 40 percent of the growth in real GNP in the first two quarters following the trough. Such historical experience has led some observers to expect a similar recovery in late 1970 or in 1971. Yet an analysis in terms of a typical "inventory cycle" is not applicable to the current situation simply because the 1969-70 economic slowdown has not been associated with a major inventory decumulation.
Another element in the near-term outlook for inventory investment is the current decline in defense procurement, which will be accompanied by a decline in inventories of defense industries. The importance of defense in the overall inventory outlook is significant, but not so overwhelming as a casual look at the period of defense buildup might suggest. The rapid expansion of defense orders and outlays in 1966 did coincide in time with the major overall inventory buildup during that period; and some of the inventory investment reflected a desire to fill the production pipeline in the defense industry with raw materials and goods-in-process. But analysis of that period indicates that only a minor fraction of the total inventory accumulation came in response to the defense buildup.
Concepts and Data
Inventory investment is dominated normally by the short-run adjustment of stocks to a relatively accurately known longer-term path. Variations in the long-run stock have only infrequently constituted a major forecasting problem, since the ratio of the inventory stock to sales has been highly stable over periods of two to five years, after allowance for a modest secular downtrend. On the other hand, forecasting the short-run changes in stocks around this path poses serious problems, for they are highly volatile. In part this volatility is accounted for by a more rapid adjustment of actual to desired stocks for inventories than for homes, plant and equipment, or even consumer durables. But the forecasting problem is complicated further because unanticipated sales changes must result in equal changes in stocks in the opposite direction, to the extent that the surprises are not immediately matched by expanded or curtailed production.
The interpretation of short-run inventory movements is further complicated by the fact that estimates of inventory accumulation that enter the national accounts are subject to more severe statistical problems than those of any other demand category. Since the stock estimates are made are important differences in inventory behavior among these sectors that deserve recognition. It is necessary to distinguish between production in response to known orders-production to order-and production in anticipation of future demand-production to stock. In the latter case, inventory planning is complicated by errors in sales forecasts that lead to involuntary inventory changes. In the former case, which characterizes inventories in durable manufacturing, sales surprises are less important. Rather, inventory movements are dominated by goods-in-process and require an alternative explanation.
Inventory investment of producers to stock can be viewed as an attempt to smooth out production by holding stock as a buffer against sudden changes in sales. This type of behavior can be described formally by specifying a desired inventory-sales relationship, a production rule, and the determinants of expected sales. Then actual inventory accumulation in the period (Vt -V_1), which will be the difference between production and actual sales during the period St, will display the familiar stock-adjustment form,
Vt-Vtl = ca + cbSee-cVt-l + (Se-St).
Thus, in the buffer stock model, inventory accumulation is composed of an anticipated component, which is related to the speed with which production is adjusted to sales changes, and an unanticipated component resulting from errors in the sales forecast. In the absence of appropriate sales forecasts, current and lagged sales are introduced into the equation and allowed to serve as a proxy for expected sales. Table 1 presents the coefficients of a set of representative inventory equations for the major sectors, generally based on quarterly estimates of constant-dollar inventory stock from the Office of Business Economics for the period 1953-69.
DURABLE TRADE
The buffer stock model is most directly applicable to the durable trade sector. The greater cyclical sensitivity of durable goods sales, together with a higher inventory-sales ratio, results in more pronounced cyclical inventory movements than appear for nondurables.
The changing timing of introduction of new models and numerous automobile and steel strikes create difficulties in accounting for durable trade within a more aggregative framework. Some of these problems are reduced by eliminating the 1959 steel strike and the more severe auto strikes from the data sample. Nevertheless, the equation embraces several periods, such as the first quarter of 1961, when sudden movements in inventories of auto dealers cause substantial errors in predicting the total. The equation also noticeably understates inventory accumulation in durable trade in late 1958 and throughout 1966.
The statistical results show a potent negative impact of existing stocks on inventory investment. They also suggest that, either because forecasts of sales are quite accurate or because adjustments of stocks are rapid, a higher level of sales actually raises inventory investment within the current quarter. But a larger part of the resulting addition to stocks takes place in the next quarter.
NONDURABLES
Because sales of nondurables are relatively insensitive to cyclical influences, and because these goods are characterized by relatively low inventorysales ratios, inventory investment in this sector makes little contribution to major shifts in production. In fact, the variance of inventory inivestment is only slightly larger than the expected sampling variability of the basic surveys of reporting firms. A large proportion of the existing variance is accounted for by erratic quarter-to-quarter movements, without the cumulative cyclical fluctuations that are so apparent in durable goods. Although it is strictly applicable only to inventories of finished goods, the extension of the buffer stock model to all of the nondurable sector does not appear to cause any major difficulty. In general, the production period is sufficiently short that no distinction is required among inventories by stage of fabrication. Further disaggregation does not improve the overall predictions, perhaps because the distinction between the inventories of finished goods of an intermediate producer and of purchased materials of a final producer introduces a degree of randomness to the stage-offabrication categories.
It does, however, prove useful to go beyond the basic buffer stock model to account for some special characteristics of inventory changes in nondurable goods. Agricultural products, which experience sudden and largely unpredictable changes in supply, are responsible for some of the erratic inventory movements in this sector. Unanticipated variations in short-run supply are necessarily absorbed by the inventory stock. This source of inventory change is taken into consideration by the addition of a variable in the equation for this sector: The quarterly change in the price deflator for farm output is inserted as a measure of changing supply conditions. There is also some evidence that lengthening delivery delays within manufacturing induce firms to hold higher inventory stocks. To account for this, the equation includes a measure of long-term purchase commitments, designated "buying policy," as a proxy for delivery delays.3
With these variables included, the statistical results show the expected negative impact of existing stocks and the positive impact of lagged sales on inventory investment. Unlike durable trade, however, the nondurable sector displays a negative relationship between current sales and inventory investment, suggesting that sales surprises dominate, and temporarily push inventories in the opposite direction.
DURABLE MANUFACTURING
Inventory investment within durable manufacturing differs sharply from that in the other sectors. While it shows a variance nearly three times that of either of the other two sectors, and accounts for a major proportion of the cyclical changes in total inventories, it displays a far greater quarterto-quarter continuity than durable trade and nondurables. In addition, the inventory-sales ratio is not as stable here in the long run as it is in the other sectors.
The major differentiating factor is the magnified role of work-in-process inventories. For example, the higher inventory-sales ratio of durable relative to nondurable manufacturing is almost fully accounted for by the higher level of work-in-process relative to sales-about 0.8 against 0.2 for monthly data. It is also here that the post-1966 rise in the overall ratio of inventories to sales is concentrated.
The greater importance of goods-in-process inventories results from the relatively long period of production for most firms within durable manufacturing. Thus, a substantial proportion of inventory investment is related to the lag between the initial production response to new orders and their final shipment. This is a more passive process than that implied by the buffer stock model in the sense that firms are responding to past orders rather than anticipating future sales.
Firms tend to produce to order rather than to stock where long periods of production are associated with specialized products. The result is that finished goods inventories are of relatively minor importance, and sales forecast errors are not a major source of instability. Purchased materials remain a significant element of variation, but stocks of materials will be more closely related to new orders than to shipments.
The major significance of these distinct characteristics of durable manufacturing is to shift the emphasis in the explanation of inventories from shipments to new orders. That new orders are important to the individual firm does not necessarily imply that they are equally so at the aggregate level. For example, in the extreme case where all final goods are produced to stock and intermediate goods are produced to order, orders would be an important determinant of inventories for intermediate goods producers. But, if these orders merely reflect expected future sales of the finished goods producers, they would simply represent a transmission of sales expectations back up the line. In that event, expected sales would still be the driving force in inventory investment. Even so, the relevant sales forecast would have to be linked to the total length of the production period rather than simply to the current quarter.
DEFENSE AND BUSINESS EQUIPMENT
Orders are a particularly important determinant of inventories within the defense and business equipment industries. Both of these finished goods industries are dominated by production to order. For both, production extends over several quarters and orders result in a major impact on income and production, reflected in inventory accumulation, in advance of the actual expenditures. The timing discrepancy between defense expenditures and their impact on the economy has been widely recognized and analyzed.4 But the timing effect is not limited to defense goods. It is important for other final products, such as business equipment, that involve a sufficiently long production-to-order process.
Several factors argue in favor of a separate treatment of the defense and equipment group within durable manufacturing. Its inventory-sales ratio is far higher than the average and thus contributes to erratic movements in the aggregate ratio when the output mix shifts between equipment and defense on the one hand and consumer-oriented industries on the other. Second, the inventory-sales ratio of this group is highly variable over periods of several years and is not readily explained in terms of a preferred buffer stock relative to sales. Third, to the extent that they reflect a firm commitment for future final sales, orders, rather than sales, should be stressed as the initial source of stimulus to inventory building in this group.
Separate estimates of inventories of the business equipment and defense industries do not exist on a basis that corresponds with the national income accounts. But an aggregate industry series for shipments, inventories, and new orders is available.5 Although it is geared to book values and is not readily converted into constant dollars, this series closely approximates the major movements of the national income accounts data. Shown in Table 1 accumulation in this sector in terms of current sales, the buying policy variable previously used as a measure of delivery delays, and a lag structure on new orders over the previous eight quarters. Inventory accumulation is thus viewed as primarily the result of a timing discrepancy between production and shipments, both of which are related to previously received new orders. The lagged inventory stock does not enter significantly into the equation, nor do current or lagged sales. These results illustrate the sharp difference between inventory behavior in this industry and in the sectors that are oriented more toward production to stock.6
The measure of delivery delays is particularly important during the 1966 period when excessive demand pressures and fears of material shortages apparently had a major impact on inventory accumulation. The orders formulation also captures the post-1966 rise in the inventory-sales ratio, for the average of the errors from 1966 to 1969 is essentially zero. An attempt was made to test for shifts in the mix of orders toward items with longer or shorter delivery periods by including aerospace orders separately; but this did not significantly improve the fit. It would appear that a separation of business equipment and defense from the rest of durable manufacturing is sufficient to capture the major effects of variations in the average period of production, and further division is not of crucial importance. Equations similar to that of Table 1 with coefficients of determination above 0.8 were obtained for separate estimates of inventory investment in defense products and in machinery and equipment.
Given these results for the defense and equipment group, one should ideally separate it from the total of durable manufacturing and then explain inventory investment for the other durable industries. But the data do not permit such an approach. As noted above, only book value data are available for inventories of defense and equipment, and these obviously cannot be subtracted from the constant-dollar stocks of total durable manufacturing so as to derive a reliable estimate of inventory investment for the rest of durable manufacturing. It seemed advisable therefore to adopt an unusual approach, focusing on the inventory investment of total durable manufacturing but using as an explanatory variable the predicted values from the inventory equation for the equipment and defense group.
6. The buying policy variable reflects in part the level of sales. But the fact that it is a highly significant explanatory variable does not imply that sales are contributing much to the explanation. As reported in Table 1 , sales taken separately have a tiny and statistically insignificant coefficient.
In doing this, shipments, new orders, and lagged inventory stock of the equipment and defense group-adjusted by the durable manufacturing deflators, for lack of anything better-are excluded from the corresponding independent variables for total durable manufacturing.
Two alternative inventory equations for durable manufacturing are shown in Table 1 . Equation (4) essentially follows a buffer stock formulation, except for the special treatment of defense and equipment. The coefficient of 1.8 on the predicted inventory investment of the defense and equipment group presumably reflects a magnified impact of correlated inventory buildups in industries supplying the defense and equipment group. It is striking that the defense and equipment prediction is the most highly significant of all the explanatory variables. The negative impact of existing stocks also comes through far more strongly than the influence of either current or lagged sales.
Equation (5) is more complex in that it includes distributed lags on changes in new orders and on a second variable, constructed by multiplying the capacity utilization rate by the change in new orders. The negative coefficient on the second variable signifies that high utilization reduces the impact of a rise in orders on the inventory-sales ratio. Such an interaction may emerge for various reasons: (1) economies in the use of work-inprocess stocks as the production pipeline fills up; (2) a postponement of the production response to new orders at high utilization of capacity; or (3) a shortening of the production period, with a consequent reduction in the ratio of goods-in-process to shipments as demand pressures increase.7
The inclusion of the orders variables brings the coefficient on the prediction for defense and equipment close to unity. With orders to supplying industries explicitly taken into account, the expected investment of the defense and equipment group is simply translated dollar for dollar into the total for durable manufacturing. The use of information on new orders significantly improves the equation, but because of the difficulty of predicting orders, equation (4) may be preferable for forecasting purposes.
The inclusion of orders variables is, of course, not new, but it has usually been accomplished by using levels of, or changes in, unfilled orders rather than the inflow of new orders. In using unfilled orders, previous studies 7. Because current sales are also in the equation and some part of a rise in orders will be reflected in them, the orders coefficients do not measure the total effect of orders on inventories. Also, since the lagged coefficients on the interaction term do not sum to zero, my results are not fully consistent with explanation (2). have emphasized precautionary motives for stock building rather than the consequences of the lag between orders and delivery. Once a lag structure for new orders was included in equation (5), no significant results could be found for unfilled orders; the precautionary motive appears to be more accurately measured by the series on purchase commitments in excess of sixty days.
SOME FURTHER RESULTS
In all of the above equations, experiments were conducted with more elaborate calculations of anticipated sales and price expectations (primarily distributed lags on past changes). A significant relationship never emerged, and the coefficients were only infrequently of the expected signs. However, use of the reported anticipations of inventory investment did yield equations nearly as accurate as those of Table 1 . The sales forecast errors still played no significant role even in conjunction with the inventory anticipations. These results are consistent with those reported in the previous section, which suggested that inventory changes within durable manufacturing are largely anticipated and result from the structure of the production process. The proper place to search further for aid from sales forecast errors seems to be within the trade sector. In that area, the length of delivery periods may limit the flexibility of stock adjustments to surprises in sales.
Recent Developments
The current economic slowdown has been marked by a steady and quite smooth decline in the rate of growth in real GNP that began with the imposition of restrictive stabilization policy in the middle of 1968. It has not been accompanied by the violent swings in inventory investment that were so apparent in previous experience. The 1966-67 period provides the most recent illustration of a more active role for inventory investment. Nonfarm inventory accumulation totaled more than $14 billion (1958 prices) in 1966 and soared to a peak rate of $19 billion in the fourth quarter. In contrast, 1969 was a year of moderate inventory accumulation at a rate less than half that of 1966. In addition, the 1966 increase was associated with a rapid expansion of defense spending. Since a reversal of the war buildup is now underway, it is becoming increasingly important to determine the impact of defense orders on inventory investment. This section first describes an attempt to isolate several factors that made 1966-67 an abnormal period of inventory accumulation and that distinguish it from the current period. It goes on to an examination of the sources and character of the current slowdown in inventory investment. Since they ignore the secondary effects on the inventories and shipments of the material-supplying industries, these estimates understate the full impact of the war buildup. The first equation for durable manufacturing in Table 1 would suggest that the impact on inventory investment of the material-supplying industries can be substantial. On the other hand, a large proportion of the early expenditures were for services and nondurable goods, sectors in which the timing discrepancy is of relatively minor importance.
These estimates of the inventory buildup appear to be significantly smaller than those Galper and Gramlich developed in their study of the lag between prime contract awards and defense expenditures.9 My results imply a shorter average time lag between production and shipment than theirs. In addition, their measure of the inventory accumulation as the difference between production and shipments is conceptually different from the one used here.
The estimates in Table 3 are also somewhat smaller than those provided by the Department of Commerce to Okun and Teeters, which were intended to include secondary effects on supplying industries.'0 Durable manufacturing was not the only source of the abnormal inventory buildup of 1966. In fact, one of the intriguing aspects of the period is the extent to which an excessive rate of inventory accumulation occurred in every sector. This would suggest that the primary cause was a general economy-wide influence such as tight resource utilization, rather than a specific influence such as the defense buildup.
The 1966 rise in nondurable inventories is explained quite well by a combination of increased precautionary holdings, a sharp curtailment of the rate of growth of final sales, and a substantial drop in farm prices in the fourth quarter. In addition, the rapid growth of final sales in 1965 resulted in a low ratio of inventories to sales at the beginning of 1966.
As Table 2 fourth quarters are substantially underestimated by the equation. This sector thus illustrates one of the difficulties of relying on a pure accelerator approach to inventory behavior. The equation is adequate for predicting the typical movements of inventories and even their response to an existing stock-sales disequilibrium. But a delayed response to sales changes does not appear to be a satisfactory explanation for the initial departure from the normal inventory-sales ratio.
An examination of the errors in the equation also reveals that it consistently underestimates the magnitude of the major cyclical swings in durable trade inventories. This may be a problem that stems from using actual sales as a proxy for expected sales, since the equation may be unable to distinguish between erratic short-run sales fluctuations and the more drastic cyclical movements that lead to major inventory adjustments. But I was unable to improve the results with either additional variables or disaggregation. I can report only that the increase in the inventory-sales ratio during 1966 was not limited to any specific category of durable trade and that the ratio returned to a more normal level by the middle of 1967.
During 1967, the response of inventory investment in durable trade and nondurables to the excesses that existed at the beginning of the period can be viewed as fairly typical by historical standards. For both sectors the inventory-sales ratio had returned to more normal levels by the end of the year, and the errors reported in Table 2 First, the likelihood of a large rebound in inventory investment is reduced by the stability of inventory behavior in the recent past. As described above, stocks did not become excessive to any major degree in 1968-69. And because excesses did not materialize, they did not have to be worked off by liquidation of stocks. Thus inventory investment starts from its positive rate of $2.1 billion (1958 prices) in the first half of 1970-in sharp contrast with the negative rates ranging from $4 billion to $6 billion that marked the last stages of the previous four recessions. Because of the substantially higher base, the prospective upswing of inventory investment is most unlikely to have the dramatic proportions witnessed in past business cycle recoveries.
An additional source of restraint will operate in durable manufacturing, where defense spending will, to a degree, reverse its effect of 1966-67. Defense Department prime contract awards for hard goods have declined 33 percent since the fourth quarter of 1968, with an 18 percent decline in the first half of 1970. Furthermore, any major expansion in private equipment orders that could offset this decline seems rather unlikely. New orders for defense and equipment, which rose 11 percent in 1969, began to reflect some of the scheduled decline of defense activity in a 6 percent drop in the first half of 1970 from the second half of 1969. Because of production delays, the impact of the decline in orders on inventories will be concentrated primarily in the latter part of 1970 and in 1971.
On the way down as well as on the way up, the especially high inventorysales ratio of defense and equipment will play a significant role. Reflecting that higher ratio, the rise in shipments of this group from 24 percent to 31 percent of total shipments of durable manufacturing accounts for an addition of about $2. In addition, while most of the reduction in defense stocks is still to come, it appears that inventory investment has largely adjusted to the decline in civilian demand. Thus, the two factors will not be simultaneously depressing inventory accumulation.
Rather, this analysis implies that, assuming no major change in fixed investment, the increase in the inventory stock over the next year will be about $2 billion less than proportionate to the rise in final sales. If real final sales should grow as much as 4 percent, inventory investment would have to be $7 billion (1958 prices) to keep the stock proportionate to sales. The suggested downward adjustment of $2 billion would then point to a $5 billion rate of inventory investment. If, however, real final sales should rise only 2 percent, the indicated rate of inventory investment would be only $1.5 billion.
All in all, the analysis would suggest that an inventory cycle is not an adequate frame of reference for viewing the present behavior of the economy. Instead of a sharp and severe cycle, there seems to be a slow but steady departure of GNP growth from a full employment path.
Comments and Discussion
James Duesenberry: Barry Bosworth is an unusually cheerful inventory investigator. Others who have worked in this field have seemed, at times, to throw up their hands because of the complexities. Yet the fact that Bosworth offers a more encouraging report on the possibilities of explaining inventories may reveal more about writing style and personality than about the actual quantitative results. His own standard errors still leave substantial unexplained variation in inventories, even though, considering the difficulties, the equations look good. The delivery lag or buying policy variable is an interesting contribution. But I am bothered by the underlying logic of that notion. It seems to say that when capacity utilization goes up, firms have trouble filling orders and a delivery lag appears. This leads the buyers of materials to try to protect themselves by increasing their orders and by making commitments farther ahead in the hope of getting their supplies guaranteed. That in turn stimulates producers of materials to turn out more. Consequently, we end up with more inventory, rather than less, as one might think at first. In the case of a capacity bottleneck, people are trying to buy things that cannot be produced fast enough. That could result in drawing inventories down, particularly at the manufacturing level, just as readily as it could push stocks up. The equations say that delivery lags operate to increase stocks, and the buying policy variable comes through loud and strong in that direction. Perhaps one reason for that effect is that, in a regime of supply difficulties, firms accumulate work in process because they run into delays and can't finish output. A semifinished thing sits there on the floor and gets counted in inventories until some order for materials is filled. I'm not proposing to explain how it operates, however. Here is a case where the empirical results are great, but the underlying logic has not been spelled out. I think it would be worthwhile for somebody to work on that.
A second feature of the statistical approach in this paper is the way defense and business equipment are chained up to durable manufacturing as a whole. That appeals to me as an ingenious way of getting around some rather difficult problems. One advantage is that it's probably easier to predict defense and equipment orders, and to analyze the causes of their movements, than it is to predict or explain the change in orders for overall durable manufacturing. The total involves all kinds of changes in orders from one sector of manufacturing to another.
Other economists have previously found some type of orders variable to be very useful in an inventory equation. But then they needed an equation to predict orders, or at least unfilled orders, and often they could not get over this hurdle to complete the system of two separate equations. This aspect of the Bosworth equations has not been tested. In testing this approach, it would be necessary to see how well one could do forecasting defense orders. They have rather long lags, so that one would not have to do too much forecasting to make this work as a complete system. The difficulties of predicting all durable orders suggests that the simpler equation (4) might work out better for forecasting than equation (5), which requires the change-in-orders variables.
Third, as Bosworth points out and as the errors of Table 2 show, 1966 seemed to be influenced by some general bullishness factor that swelled inventory investment in nondurables and durables alike. It is striking that the errors in 1966 were in the same direction, all across the board, even with the buying policy variable included. This raises suspicions that some factor, which is not picked up adequately here, was operating. It points to the need for detective work to find the omitted variable.
One It is also striking that disaggregating by stage of fabrication did not help. There are good analytical reasons to believe it might, but it did not. On the other hand, it pays to separate business equipment and defense from the rest of durable manufacturing. Moreover, combining equipment and defense is a special kind of aggregation that seems to be acceptable. Presumably this works because these two industries have the same characteristics of production to order and of substantial lags in the production process. The nature of demand is entirely different for the defense industry and for the business equipment industry.
One recurring theme of the paper is the major significance of the difference between production to order and production to stock. This raises other interesting and thought-provoking issues. First, it is dangerous to assume that production to order and long lags in the production prodess necessarily go together. To be sure, both will appear in the case of ex-pensive, highly specialized products. But fruit growers have long lags and yet produce to stock. And good short-order cooks produce to order with short lags. It may be important to distinguish these two forces in inventory models.
Second, where there is both a long production process and production to order, firms might be expected to be able to predict their shipments accurately over a significant time horizon. Basically, their shipments for some months ahead ought to be determined by what is in the pipelineby supply considerations rather than any developments in demand. I do not think the data show that such firms are especially accurate in their sales forecasts. Maybe the supply considerations are hard to predict. Maybe such firms are not terribly interested in near-term shipments and do not make much effort to forecast them accurately.
The paper also has several interesting results on what variables work and where they work. It is striking that the equations imply that nondurables are the only sector in which, on the basis of quarterly data, a rise in current sales means a significant decline in inventory investment. It is the only place where surprises in sales push inventories in the opposite direction for as long as a quarter. In durable trade and durable manufacturing, the higher the current quarter's sales, the higher the current quarter's inventories are expected to be, according to these equations. That doesn't leave much scope for involuntary accumulation or liquidation of stocks.
The results on the buying policy variable are resounding. I will be paying more attention to that series as a leading indicator, in light of these findings. I am puzzled, however, by the fact that it works for business equipment and defense and not for the rest of durable manufacturing. Could that throw any light on the questions James Duesenberry raised about the possible negative-as well as positive-impacts of delivery lags on stocks?
In the review of recent experience, the paper reveals what a heroic role nondurable stocks have played in 1969-70. In the 1966-67 period, the downswing in the nondurable accumulation rate was $5 billion. In the current period, the nondurable rate actually rose $1.5 billion, from $2.6 billion in the third quarter of 1969 to $4.1 billion in the second quarter of 1970. It was never down more than $1.6 billion during this period. It is a most unusual candidate to be cast as a hero in stabilizing the economy.
In Alan Greenspan supported Bosworth's interpretation of the buying policy variable. He suggested that the lengthening of commitments and stock building can be observed in the steel industry. Greenspan noted that a lengthening of commitments by purchasers might reflect their judgment that they needed to get on the books sooner in order to get delivery on time. In that sense, the variable might measure supplier's policy as much as buyer's policy.
A number of questions focused on the nature and treatment of inventory data. Gardner Ackley asked whether anyone had tried to forecast the national accounts measure of inventory change in two stages, first predicting book value and then predicting the inventory valuation adjustment of the national income accounts. Bosworth said that it appeared possible to explain the national accounts measure (that is, the figure adjusted for inventory valuation) about as accurately in a single step as one could explain book values. George Jaszi suggested that the erratic movement of auto dealers' stocks made these a likely candidate for separate treatment from other durable trade stocks; but Bosworth reported that his efforts to disaggregate in this way had not yielded improved results. Alan Greenspan suggested that the financial data on trade credit "float" might be investigated for possible clues on the magnitude and movement of in-transit inventories.
Most of the participants in the discussion seemed to share Bosworth's general appraisal of a sluggish near-term outlook for inventory investment. William Fellner, however, noted that inventory-sales ratios have tended to be higher in the early stages of past cyclical recoveries than they are at the present time. He wondered whether this might not offset, in part, some of the other factors tending to restrain the inventory rebound in the current situation. Alan Greenspan suggested that the differences in inventory-sales ratios between the present and previous upturns may not be very significant. Price inflation, which affects sales more fully than it affects the book value of stocks, tends to lower the current statistics on inventory-sales ratios, as compared with earlier periods.
